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THE IHDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN THE LOW COUNTRIES IN THE FIRST
HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY~--A COHPARATIVE CASE STUDYl
by
Joel Hokyr

Northw estern Europe has always enjoyed a promin ent and perhaps
slightl y dispro portion ate role in the discip line of Economic Histor y.
It is therefo re surpris ing that the Low Countr ies in the 19th century

have as yet not receive d from English -speaki ng Economic Histor ians
the attenti on they deserve by their locatio n, their size and the unique ness of their case.
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This neglec t is the more surpris ing becaus e the two countr ies,
Belgium and the Nether lands, offer a unique opport unity for compar ative economic history :

ovo countr ies of compar able size, located in

the same corner of Europe , surroun ded by giants , with consid erable

overlap ping in lingui stic a~d cultur al backgro unds.

One of them,

Belgium, undergo es a process of ra?id indust rializa tion in the first half
of the 19th century , emergin g in the 1840's as the most indust rialize d
country on the contin ent.

On the other hand, very little industr ia=

lizatio n can be observe d in the Nether lands in the first half of the
19th century .

It may be import ant to inquire into the underly ing

causes of this gap not only in order to unders tand the particu lar
econom ies of the Low Countr ies, but also because this investi gation
could shed some light on the mechanisms of economic growth and
indust rializa tion in certain types of econom ies.
The first section of this paper will be devoted to a summary
descrip tion of the indust rial sectors of the two countr ies between

-21798 and 1850.

Then some of the traditional explanations that have

been put forward to explain their divergent patterns will be presented.
This will be followed by a simple lfto'del of economic growth ·which will
help in focusing on one crucial element in the differential development
of the two countries.

In section IV, the basin relevance of this

model will be demonstrated.

Finally, some evidence will be presented

and some suggestions for future research made.
I

For the purpose of this paper it is useful to define the dis
continuous element of the industrial revolution as the adoption of a
new technology that is used to produce the same (or very similar)

commodities that were formerly produced, by a new and more capital
intensive technique.

The new technology is exogenously given to the

economy (in this case, imported from England).

This makes ~~;possible

to point at the closing years of the 18th century as the beginning of
the industrial revolution in Belgium.

From the beginning, three main

centers of this industry can be distinguished:

(i) the cotton center

in East Flanders, in and around Ghent; (ii) the wool center in the
d4partment de

3. 'Ourthe (now the province of Liege);· along the Vesdre

with Verviers and Eupen as its main focal points; (iii) the heavy

industry in the city of Lieze and surroundings and in the department de
Jemappes (now the province of Eainault).

These three industr-±es underwent

remarkable expansion in the

closing years of the 18th century and the first twelve years of the 19th.
This can be illustrated by a few figures t~at are, of course, a poor
substitute for an exhaustive study on the Belgian industry in the
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French period

~~t

still rennins to be written.

The mechanized cotton

spinning industry in Ghent grew from zero i:a 17i8 (the year in which
Lievin Bauwens smuggled his first mule from England to the continent)
to 115,000 spindles employing about 10,000 workers in 1810.~

There

is reason to believe that Ghent accounted for about two thirds of the
total cotton industry in Flanders.

4

The order of magnitude attained

by this industry in a short period can thus easily be seen.

In 1798, the same year that mechanized cotton spinninr, was
introduced in the Continent, the wool-producing firm of Biolley and
Simonis in Verviers hired William Cockerill to construct the first
spinning mills and carding machines at their plant.

As

in the cotton

industry, the discontinuous element in this development is not the
emergence of a new innustry

~

nihiJ.o, but rather the application of

a new technique to the production of old goods and the associated
quantitative expansion,

The annual rate of grm-rth of the output of

drapes between 1800 and 1810 is estimated at 6%, as compared to 0.46% ... ..,....
beb1een 1752 and 1784.

5

As foc:the heavy industry, the data arc~ less easily interpreted;

two of the major breakthroughs in the English iron industry namely
the use of coke in the smelting process and Cort's rolling and puddling
6
.~evertheless,
process were introduced only after the Fren~h period.
the number of blast furnaces , estimated at 63 in the period before

1795, rose to 83 in 1814.

The output per furae:ce

1000 kg. a day to as much as 3000 kg. a day.

7

grew from less than

Total output of cast

iron in the departement Sambre et Heuse (today the province of Namur)
grew according to one source from 10,671 ton in 1789 to 15,240 in 1811.

8

•;,
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The collapse of the iJapoleonic Empire and the incorporation of

Belgium in the Dutch monarchy caused considerable strain to the young
By the end of the decade, however, it seems that

Belgian industry.

recovery was by and large complete.

In the mid twenties many important

technological changes were intrcduced, including i. a. widespread use of
steam power and mechanized weaving in cotton and wool.

The total

number of spindles in the Flemish cotton industry doubled in the 15 years
of Dutch rule.

9

The total amount of fixed capital in the cotton-spinning

industry in East Flanders was estimated by a contemporary writer to have
10
grown from about 1.5 million guilders in 1817 to 2.7 million in 1826.
Similarly the woollen industry recovered after suffering a severe setback
in the last years of the Empire:

the arrondissement of Verviers produced

about 88,000 pieces in 1811, 65,000 in 1815 a.nd between 100,000 and 12'},000
11
,
in,.a-1830.

Likewi~e~ the metallurgical industry grew considerably:

1817

marks the founding of John Cockerill's faaous machine factory at Seraing,
soon to become the most prominent pl<",nt of its kind on the Continent.
Total output of cast i::on t·Jas eeti:::iated in 1.r<1r,

(29 thot:.sand ton).

12

t-n

ht=i h~ million pounds

In the mid -:hirties estimates vary between 135

d ton. 13
.
t h ousand an d l _.co tnousan

Output of coal increased from 16 thousand

ton in 1815 to 180 thousand in 1830.H
After the revolution of :830, industrialization seemed to lose
some momentum.

The:~.e is .sc::ae evidence that the rate of growth of the

cotton industry, due to a £al: in the price of the final goods as well
15
Some
as rising raw material prices, was slowing down considerably.
growth, however, still went on, despitE:c difficulties on the demand
side.

In 1846 the number of spindles in the cotton industry was about

-5the same as in 1836,

16

but raw cotton imports increase a

17

so that

it is possible that excess capacity was reduced and that old machine s
were replaced by new and better ones.

The woollen industry fared

much better and was able to quadrup le its exports between 1832 and 1844
18
The
(though the starting point of this series is unnatur ally tow).
greates t expansio n was experien ced by heavy industry , doubtle ssly due
in part to the constru ction of a railway network .

In 1850, thus, Belgium

emerges as the most industr ialized country on the Contine nt.
It should be emphasiz ed that the new industry did not supplan t
the old industry for

<1.

long tir.1e, but rather coexiste d with it for most

of the period under discussi on.

The old industry in Belgium before

the industr ial revoluti on ·w<2a a typical nproto-i :i.dustry "--a rural
domestic industry of pco.oontc uho had to suprler.i. ent tlw.ir incomes

which had become insuffic ient because of ;)Opulat ion pressure on the
land.

19

The three main centers of the proto-in dustrial sector

coincide d to a large exte:--.. t with the three centers of modern industry t

the linen industry in Flander s, the woollen industry around V~rvier s'
and the metallu rgical putting- out industry (nail-ma kins, cutlery etc.)
That this is no fortuito us coincide nce

in Liege, Hainaul t and l~amur.
will soon become clear.
As

to the Netherla nds, the availab ility of data is even more

restrict ive than in Belgimn .

But it is beyond doubt that industr ia

lization was consider ably slower.

It is importa nt to keep in mind

that at the beginnin g of the period the detherla nds were far from
being a non-ind ustrial country.
(Holland ), much industry existed.

Especia lly in the maritime province
Host of these industri es were

-6"traffics", i.e. activities associated directly or indirectly with
Dutch commerce and shippi:::c; (which were still substantial at the end
of the 18th century).

In addition to ship-yards., sail making and food

packing industries, the most important industries were paper, glass and
earthware, sugar refineries, distilleries and breweries, tobacco,
luxury textiles (calico printing) etc.

Some of these industries had

already declined considerably in the 18th century, others much less so.

20

It is clear, however, that these industries suffered very severely

during the French period, especially during the years of the continental
blockade, and declined to a fraction of their initial size.

21

The

impoverished Dutch cities lost considerable fractions of their population,
and many of the remaining urban dwellers were reduced to charity.

22

The post-lJapoleonic period was a period of slow recovery for the
traffic industries.

The lack of data does not allow the determination

of the extent to which this ret:overy

was

comp letad by 1830.

1:-i11at is

clear is that ilcdustria.lization of the k:tnd that 3elgium had experienced
did not take place.

In 1830 the lnrgest m:d. best known r.1achine factory

in the Netherlands employed only 80-100 ,-1ori.;.2rs.

23

T:-,e textile industry

24 ·1 ·"
\.
1
~•
• •
t ry J_n
. th e
areas was sta.gnant
w:i:u.E: t.1e
woo.i...Len
1.nctus
i n t h e T.,-1ente

South (around Tilburg) gn.w very slowly anc: onl:1 with considerable government help.
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No other indus·::rie~'3 of importance seem to have developed.

The secession of Belgium in 1830 ge.ve a first push to adoption of
new and more efficient tec:miques in the Netherlands.
modernization can be observe..:l.

A few signs of

SoGe progress was made in the traffic

industries in the maritir,,e provinces, ar.d even more important were the

-7developm ents in the few areas ire which the:.e was some proto-in dustry
(mainly in the East and South).

The tot:i.l horsepow er of the steam

engines used by the cotton industry in thE: Twente area rose between

1830 and 1850 from a negligib le 18 HP to a slightly less negligib le
26

Exports of th:..s industry increase d from about 30,000
27 The influx of a few
pieces in 1834 to 730, oori pieces in 184C,

220 HP.

Belgiam. Orangis t e~1tre:,r eneurs, as well at, the demand of the Dutch
Inda.es for cotton goods; no longer supp:.ied by Flenish industry ,
explain this gro,,,rth"

In the Ti:1..bi.irg a:i:ea in the South, where these

benefic ial effects were by and large aosent, growth was mach slower.
Thus one could expec:: a large gap between the two countrie s
around 1850, although diverge nt rates of growth do not prove this a priori.
Unfortu nately the lack of compara ble natioua l income accounts mnke such

a comparis on impossi ble.

Some very crude indicato rs can be used here,

however , to hint at the orders of magnitud e involved .

The total

number of steam engines in the Dutch economy in 1837 is estimate d at 72
with a

of 1120 HP,

rHmhing

to 392 machine s with 7193. 25 HP

The correspo nding figures for Belgium for 1846 are 1514
28
The total value of Belgian
machine s, with a capacity of 37,007 HP.
in 1853.

textile exports in 1844 was about 60 million francs in 1833 prices,
.

.
or a f ew percent 1 ess 1.n cur~ent prices.

29

Dutch textile exports

in current prices (ave~age 1846-185 0) was 9.4 million guilders or
...1.on :..~ t
some 20 rai·1·.

a'fi<CS.

30

A very differen t cut equally suggest ive

illustra tion pen.ains to the par':itip ation i:c. the famed Crystal Place
exhibiti on in ::..851.

i,;::~lgium was repres£n tec. by 512 entries which won

2 gold medals and 97 :iis·-::inc ticr:.s,

Ths :::ethe:-:lands se:1t 114 exhibits

-8. ~ . .ons. 31
"
' -, a:~ul 1(, c1.stinCLJ
, a go 11a ;-n.e:o.a._
.
o f whi c h one receivea

The Belgian

populatio n at the time uas approxim ately 50% larger than Dutch population.
II

Some explanati ons of this quite remarkabl e example of uneven
developme nt have been suggested in the literatur e, though the problem
32
The most
itself has not frequentl y been posed in explicit form..
obvious differenc e between the two countries is in their respectiv e
physical endowmen ts:

Belgium has rich deposits of coal and iron,

whereas the Netherlan ds have relativel y more fertile agricultu ral land,
but no iron and virtually no coal.

This argument can hardly explain

the whole phenomenon since two of the pivotal sectors in Belgian
industry, wool and cot to:,., uacd imported rav :i-iaterials .
began to be used widely in 3elgium oaly after 1825.

Steam power

On the other heii'd,

the Dutch did have :cich endo,,'ID.ents of ;_:,eat, uhich ;;.;as widely used as

. dustry. 33
. Dutch in
a f ue 1 in

In addition, the im?ortance . of wind as an

energy source sho 1-1.ld :10t be d:isconnte d.

The pc.per, oil and sawmiUl

industrie s in lforth Holland relied heav-ily on this cheap source of

power.

34
The differenc e in h:i.storiea l bac:qnoun d is of somewhat greater

importanc e.

Destructi ve ~-Jars and political settlemen ts had destr~yed

all of the Belgian. shipping accl c0mmerce and most of its industry in

the last decades of the 16th century, whereas these activitie s prospered
in the Netherlan ds.
class

The resu].t was that a political ly dominant commercia l

a la Al:lsterda m--probat ly

a hindrance to mo~ern industry- -was absent

-9in Belgium.

Of equal importance was the absence in Belgium of a

heritage of technological traditionalism and entrepreneurial conservatism.
The latter two were some of the factors that made it so difficult for
the Dutch traffics to transform themselves into modern industry.

Losses

sustained by the traffic industries in the last third of the 18th century
and the first decade and a half of the 19th may have discouraged the
already very risk-&verse Dutch investors from industrial projects.
Linked to this argument is the emphasis put on the demand side.
The Belgian provinces were annexed to FtJ~r..ce in 1795 and enjoyed a
large market of 50 r:o SJ ni11.::..or. ccr:s .1::iers (including Dilitary demand,
1

an important cor,rpm,ent) t1n'.::..J_ th,.'!

,::')J

1e:,se of the -First Empire.

This

demand more tha:,. compens:-~t•?a for th-3 lo:::s of the overseas market.

On

the other har.d, t:ie Lie·::1:.e:c:'..:,:;,:;s 121.e L,.. . : or-:·orL;:e~ into the Empire as
late as 1810 ., and tl1e ta1icf b.:::n:::i-,, c bet\•,',_en t~1e Dutch provinces and
the rest of the Er:i.pire ,-,as nr : li:'.: ::2c1 uut:i.l 1812, 35

:Jbviously ~ ad-

vantages on the der.iand side p-r.:.vided the Helg:'..2ns uith a considf·r
able edge over the Du-:.:ci:i..

rioweve:-, this canaot fully explain the

continuous growing of the gap du:=ing tl1e Dutch period and the post
revolutionary period,. and it is certain that the :J..ndustries that grew
in Belgium during the Empire werE; not "hot-house industries 11 • 36
Similar to this vein is the line that emphasizes the various
roles of the respecti7e governments that ruled the two countries.

The

help and encouragement enjoY..ed by the Belgian industry from the
Austrian and later F1:ench governm.ents in the form of tariff protection,
prizes for inventior:s, tedmological contests, exhibitions, the opening
of technical schools and subsidies were indeed of major ir.1portance.

-10-

Hore unexp ected is the attitu de of King Willia m I of Orange , who tried
part of
to encour age Belgia n indust ry as much as he could and committed
Societ e
his privat e wealth to this purpos e. The foundi ng of the famous
GEner ale is only one example of this policy .
under lines rather than resolv es the proble m.

37

But this in a sense

Why would a Dutch (and

rather
protes tant) King litera lly bet all his money on Belgia n indust ry
Northe rn
than try to emula te it by establ ishing simila r enterp rises in the
provin ces?

ic
An argum ent freque ntly encoun tered in the t1ritin gs of Dutch econom
ardnes s has
histor ians as an explan ation for their count ry's relati ve backw
18th and
been the lacka daisic al menta lity of Dutch entrep reneur s in the
19th centu ries.

It is intere sting to note that a kind of "Landes-Gerschenkron

ship can be
debata" on the import ance of social attituc .es an3. entrep reneur
ob serve d among

Dutch

. 1·ists, 38
specia

"• •• The indus trialis t -:j;~ ti:e early capit alist period
(i.e. 1813-1 870) ••• is conten t with a norma l profit and does
not even consid er changi ng his methods as lone as he is not
compe lled to by his consumers ••• he does not engage in
organ izatio n or calcul ations , leavin g this matter to his fore
man ••• the indus trialis ts of this period cannot compl ain abaut
lack of leisur e and could devote themse lves to11 what was then
consid ered as the noble st pas time: poetry •••
·r.:h"'-i
y.'r ty. 39
wri tes. ·an. au1..

vative
Protot ypes and carica tures of narrow -minde d, cautio us and conser

as in the
entrep reneur s can be found in 19th centur y Dutch litera ture, such
of this are
writin gs of Hildeb rand and Potgie ter. The economic implic ations
obviou s:

techno logica l backw ardnes s, high risk aversi on and high leisur e

prefer ence of entrep reneu rs.

If one extend s "entre prene urial attitu des" to

for Dutch
includ e saving and invest ment behav ior, a satisf actory explan ation

-11-

slow indust rializa tion could be obtaine d.

However. the differe nces in

this respec t betwee n the two countr ies are a matter of degree rather of
essenc e.

Horeov er, entrepr eneurs hip was to some extent an interna tional

ly mobile factor- -many of the pionee rs of Belgian industr y were English
or of English descen t so that its relativ e absence cannot fully accoun t
for long-ru n trends.
Finally , the existen ce of a large proto- indust rial sector in
Belgium and the relativ e density of rural popula tion have recentl y been
4
. B
.
. dustr i a 1·ization
gium. o This
•e1.
in
put f orward as an exp l anat i on o f in
clear
view is correc t, but r,1erits some elabor ation, since it is by no means
which mechanism is ope~at ing here.

Capita l accumu lation in the proto

indust ry, cited by i.iendel s, seenec relativ ely minor, since there were

severe difficu lties in tra...sfo rr.lin3 accumu lated circula ting capita l into

fixed capita l in._.;the abse::.ce of good capi -:al B.::i.rkets.

Nor is there much

reason to believe t~at the proto-i ndustry created a techno logical and
entrep reneur ial infrast ructur e that facilit ated the growth of modern
industr y.

Inventi ons were by and large all importe d from England and

n.
it is far from clear how the proto-i ndustry facilit ated their adoptio
Most entrepr eneurs , except in the woollen indust ry, were homines

~

or of comme rcial backgro unds and seldom directl y connec ted to proto-

indust rial produc tion.

41

It will thus be useful to develop a more formal

framework in which the variou s factors in this process can be analyze d with
some rigor.

... .
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III
odities are pro
Assume an open economy in whic h only two comm
l revo lutio n both are
duce d, text iles and food . Befo re the indu stria
(A) is prod uced by a
prod uced in a trad ition al (rur al) sect or. Food
of land , wher eas the
usua l prod uctio n func tion with a fixed amount
a one- inpu t, cons tantoutp ut of the prot o-in dust ry, Z, is prod uced by
retu rns- to-s cale tech niqu e.

42

Thus :

.dA

~ >

(1)

(2)

Z = b•L

iA

o, 2

< 0

dL

z

amount of labo r alloc ated
wher e Tis the (fixe d) amount of Land 1 LA the
vi.ty of labo r in the prod uctio n
to the prod uctio n of A nnd b the prod uctia
that only A is bein g consumed,
of z. For simp licit y it wi.11 be assumec:
n pres sure on the land is such
whil e Z is comp letel y expo rted. Popu latio
the whol e popu latio n.
that agri cult ural outp ut is insu ffici ent to feed
et by the reven ue of
Hence the need to supp leme nt the peas ants ' budg
gh, the term s of trad e
expo rted Z good s. If the economy is smal l enou
PA
,
,
food
for
ange
exch
in
ad
abro
face d by it in selli ng its Z goods

Pz

equa l to
By prop er choi ce of unit s we can set this ratio
peas ants are in equi 
unit y. It is clea r then that the cond ition that
dA
PA dA
n grow th can go on unlibri um requ ires b = P dL ~ dL" Hence popu latio
z
e ther e ~re no dimi nishi ng
chec ked by the usua l Halt husi an mech anism s, sinc
are cons tant.

This is the subs tanc e of Hend els'
43
the 18th cent ury.
in
ders
Flan
in
n
latio
popu
to
rd
rega
in
ent
argum

retu rns in the Z-good prod uctio n.
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The more important result, for our purposes, is that b will dominate the
agricultural wage irrespective of the allocation of labor between the
production of Zand the production of A.
Assume now that the industrial revolution "takes place".

A new.

z
the z

modern sector is created which produces a close substitute for the
good.

For simplicity assume that this new good is identical to

good, but to avoid confusion denote it separately, Q.

Assume that Q is

produced by a production function using both fixed capital and labor in
44
fixed proportions

Q = c•min (LQ, nK)

(3)

where n is the number of workers manning each machine and c is the output
of each worker.

In addition, the modern sector produces machines.

Machines

are made by labor only, under constant returns to scale and are assumed to
be eternal•

45

(4)

•

K = m•L

K

where mis the productivity of labour in producing machines.
We llave thus a two-sector, open economy with a traditional sector

producing A and

z. a modern sector producing

Q. and Kand a rest of the

world sector. patiently buying all of Zand all of Qin exchange for
A goods at a fixed ratio.

Again we shall assume for simplicity that

the workers in the modern sector consume only A goods, so that the whole
industrial output of Zand Q goods is exported.

-14-

er,
I shall introd uce now two additi onal assum ptions that are, howev
of
not simpl ificati ons but styliz ed facts, descri bing the early stages
The first is the assum ption tr.At there is no capita l

indus trializ ation.

all (excep t fh"e very first) invest ments are financ ed exclus ively
46 Secon dly, all techno logica l change is embod ied
out of retain ed profit s.

marke t:

l are
in new capita l goods so that techno logica l progre ss and capita
simult aneou sly taking place.

47

Conse quentl y capita l accum ulation is
The meanin g

a necess ary condit ion for indus trializ ation and growth .

define d
of this assum ption is that techno logica l progre ss is not only
to build
as a change that enable s, say, the machin e making work- ~ops__

better machi nes.

Techn ologic al progre ss also includ es the transi tion of

embody
workers from the Z~sec tor to the Q-sec tor to work on machin es that
a techno logy super ior to the one used in the Z-sec tor.
It will by now have become clear that the struct ure of this model
hired at
is very simila r to a surplu s-labo r economy, since labor can be
a fixed cost, b.

48

llote, howev er, that there is no "surpl us" labor

in any
in this econo my--a ll labor is employ ed and none is supera bunda nt
49
but
wage 11 ,
sense, The param eter bis not a "cons tant instit ution al
and linear
a fixed oppo rtuni ty~ of labor determ ined by a one input

techni que descri bed by eq. (2).

•

The workin g of the model can now be sketch ed.

For any given capita l

but sub
stock K (every thing except the param eters is a functi on of time

script s will!b e suppre ssed) the input of labor is given:

(5)

.Lin.....

-15-

equal unity)
which produc es an outpu t or revenu e (since prices are set to

(6)

On

Q = cnK.

the other hand the wage rate is fixed at b.

(7)

Hence total profit s are:

R = cnK - bnK = nK(c-b ).

the firm.
Out of this profit , a fixed ·iprop ortion s 'IT · is plough ed back into
con~t itutes a wage fund that is used to hire workers
In other words, SR
'IT

in the machin e produc ing sector .

The number of worke rs that can be hired is:

(8)

and their output i:i te1."111s o-r- machin es is:

substi tuting (7) into (9) and rearra nging yields :

(10)

where g is the (warra nted) rate of growth .

On the other hand, define total

or constr uction
past invest ment in fixed capita l as outlay s in the ptirch asing
of capita l goods1-

-16-

I =

(11)

bK
m

then the rate of profit, Tr, is:

(12)

1T

=

R

C

I = nm(b -

1) =

sg

or

Tr

g

= s'lT•Tr. 50

It is important to emphasize the meaning of
s1T, 1T

'IT,

since for a given

will determine the rate of growth of the economy.

model are classical rather than neo-classical:

they are the residual of

.d 51
the tota1 revenue a f ter uases ]:-,ave been pai.

regarded as the marginal product of capital.
can be shown to diverge from the latter.

Profits in this

In no way should

In fact,

1r,

1T

be

in 8eneral,

It is.more fruitful to view

1T

as a rate of return to entreprene-:1.rship, tl:e rate of return to capital
(as Solow claims) or the :iarxian rate of profit (since R is clear_ly

of a quasi-rent.

As has been noted the economy produces its output of

textiles by two techniques, an efficient one (Q) and an inefficient one
(Z).

The econony ::annot shift inst2.ntzneously from one technique to the

other because the superior technology is embodied in new capital goods
and the supply of capital goods is limited by a bottleneck in saving.

The

importance of this bottleneck is detem.ined by the distribution of income
and bys •
Tf

Hence, the two techniques coexist, aacl as long as this dis-

equilibrium situation lasts, the more efficient technique earns a quasirent.

The temporary nature of this rent implies that in the long run

prices of
either nomin al wages will start to risft•. until they reach c or
indus trial goods will start to fall.

In either case the rate of profit

unless
and hence capita l accum ulation should eventu ally fall to zero
tinuit y,
embod ied techno logica l change contin ues after the initia l discon
so that there are a multit ude of techni ques rather than two.
ch
The import ance of eq. (12).., even in the more simpl istic two-te
income
niques model is in establ ishing a direct link betwee n initia l
distri butio n condit ions and the rate of capita l accum ulation .

The

o
param eter bis equal to the wage rate only by virtue of the "pseud
labor surplu s" situat ion.

In any other case, in which modern indust ry

ulation
faces an upward s slopin g labor supply curve the rate of accum
time,
of capita l is not consta nt as given in eq. (10) but falls over
ation.
since in this case wages rise with the proces s of indus trializ
of
Moreo ver, it will be seen that even in cases in which the supply
be of crucia l
labor is infini tely elasti c, the initia l level of wages will
impor tance.

Subst itute WN (wages in countr y N) and WB (wages in countr y B)

for b in equati on (12) and assume W,l\1 > WB.

Two cases can be distin guishe d:

e and
in one case WN > c > WB in which case countr y B will indus trializ
countr y N will not.

In the other case c > WN > WB' so that both count

(and
ries will adopt the new techni que, but the rate of accum ulation
hence of adopti on) will be faster in countr y B.
s
Needle ss to say, there is no conten tion that wage differ ential
under
were the most crucia l factor in determ ining which countr ies would
go the indus trial revolu tion and which not.

Obvio usly, differ ences in

the param eter s 'IT will have si!!lila r effect s.

11oreo ver, there is no need

sane among
for the three techno lcr;ica l param eters n, c, and m to be the

-18countries with highly different infrastructures .

It is also unrealistic

for many countries to assume that demand was perfectly elastic.

In the

case of the Low Countries, however, it seems that these other factors,
though anything but negligible, were of secondary order of importance
in comparison to the wage differential.

IV
Why should one expect a considerable wage differential between
Belgium and the Netherlands?

As there was a large proto-industri al

sector in Belgiuo but not in the Netherlands, the pseudo sur?lus labor
model described in the p:-evious section applies to the former but not
to the latter.

Although there is nc, strong a priori reason why the

parameter b, derived from. the Z-good producing sector, should be particularly low, there is little ioub-:: that in £act it was.

Agricultural

productivity in Belgium was lower th2.n ir: the ::etherlands, since the

labor/land ratio ,-,as much higher.

In lSJ-5 total population of the

Northern provinces (not including Dutch Limburg) was 2,046,885 persons
2
on an area of 30,386 km , which yields an overall density of 67.3 persons
2

per km •

The correspondii1g figures for the Belgian provinces were

3,377,617 on an area of 34,217 (including Luxemburg), implying a density
2
of 98.7 per km.

The Northern provinces were, however, much more urbanized and if
one subtracts off urban population the ratio of agricultural population
2

becomes 40.9 in the l'~orthern provinces and 78.7 in the Southern
52
The gap in agricultural productivity would be smaller than
provinces.

per km

these figures imply, because the Belgians did have the Z-goo§, so that
agricultural productivity would not fall below the productivity in J-good
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prod uctio n.

But th(: fact the.t ~ ex;:e pt for two areas , there is
littl e

·
· t·,.--·,e
erlnnds indic ates that agric ultur al activ ity
Z-goo d produ c t ion
in
. :,,•e·th
was, in fact, more produ ctive than in Belgi um.

The noted Dutch states man~

and poli tical econo mist, Van Hogend ..vrP, uas once asked by a Flem ish gent leman what the Dutch peasa nts did if they neith er
spun nor wove . The reply
was that they made butte r and chees e and that this
provi ded them with
. .
suff 1.c1.e
nt work • 53 He shoul d have siid "suff icien t incom e".
The extra ordin arily low wages paid in the proto -indu
stry has struc k
conte mpor aries as well as histo rians . In the Flem
ish linen indu stry,
for exam ple, a memorandum from 1765 estim ates the dai]y
incom e of a weav er
to be 7 to 8 sous (0.63 to O. 72 centi mes) , which
enabl ed the weav er to
subs ist on a diet of rye bread , potat oes, butte rmilk
, a littl e bacon on
Sunda ys and wate r.
1789 . 54

Even lower figur es are quote d in a lette r datin g
from

In the 19th centu ry~ after

2

shor t boom durin g the empi re, the

wage s of linen weav ers and spinn ers feil to new
lows, :::-eaching catas troph ic
dime nsion s in the 1830 1 s and 1840 's, 55 It shoul ci
be noted that durin g
most of the perio d under discu ssion the Fle~i sh
proto -indu stry was for its
grea ter part self-e mplo yed r<1tn.er than a ?trtt:i .ng=o
ut ind,.1siXY, so that the
terms of trade betue en final outpu t~ raw· mater ~_als
and food ·whol ly deter mine d
the incom e of the proto -::.nd ustria l work ers, given
2_ prod uctiv ity coef ficie nt b.
The wool len and metal lurgic :::1 rural indu strie s in
the Verv iers-L il1ge
area and in Hain ault were 1• on the other he.nd, most
ly putti ng-o ut indu strie s.
Putti ng-o ut in the Z-good comp licate s the pictu re
somew hat, espe ciall y becau se
the truck systet.1 (paym ents of ,·,ages in kind) and
embe zzlem ent of mate rials
by the work ers tend to d::.at ort the littl e infor matio
n on wages that is
56
avail able.
It is clear nev~ !'thel ess that t'.1ese wages were very
low. A
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source from 1741 estirr..ated the wages in Leyden, Tilburg and Verviers
57 Wages in the woollen industry
to relate to each other as 3:1.5:1.
remained more b~ less stable throughou t the 18th century, rising somewhat
in the first decade of the 19th, but less than proportio nally to the
.

.
r i se in output prices.

58

In the nail industry in the Charleroi area,

the best workers earned an off-seaso n wage of 6-7 sous, whereas others
made no more than 3-4 sous.
of the Flemish sou).

(The sou or patard de Liege was about 70%

During peak seasons, wages were much higher, but

this lasted only for about six weeks annually.

59

The situation in the Netherlan ds was more complicat ed.

It is

possible, of course, to explaj.r.. the wage differen tial between the
Netherlan ds and Belgiurl entirely by the very absence of a prate-ind ustry
in the Netherlan ds and the h:Lgher agricultu ral productiv ity implied by
But it seer.is that ,-;ages in the l~etherlan ds were high compared not
6C
"The wages of labour
only to Belgium but to other countries as well.
that.

are said to be higher :~:1 l'.olland than !_n England, and the Dutch, it is
well known, trade upon lower p::-ofits than any :,eople in Europe" writes
Adam Smith.

61

Some additiona l conjectur es in regard to the reasons of the high
level of Dutch wages are thus in order.

The fac·:: that urbanizat ion was

so intense may by itsel:~ be a fr,ctor, since mortality in the cities was
high and this tends to underline the need for bidding away workers from
agricultu re at relativel y high ,rages,

In addition·, the existence

of a large structure of welfare and charity organizat ions, especiall y
in the cities, may have had considera ble effect on the level of wages

-21in general and its downward stickiness in particular.

In addition,

it could be that the high wages were established during the peak of
Dutch economic prosperity and.:/'had since outlived it, maintained by
inertia and institutions preventing them from falling during less
favourable periods.

It is also possible that, since employment in the

Dutch cities was either directly or i11directly connected to the
commercial-maritime sector, employment was subject to rather severe
fluctuations, so that wages included a risk premium.
An interesting note is struck by Ch3rles Hilson.

Tlie large

government debt in the Hetherlands, Hilson argues, caused an exception

ally high level of taxation.

Since most taxation was indirect and

levied on- necessary consm:1ptj_o11 gocds, this tended to drive the wage
r..?

level up and profits ar:d :)rocuctioa down." ·

.L':1is

fits in well uith

the framework desc:ti:J-2cl c:t'Jove, ~specially aince taxes remained high in

the 19th century.
But on the other hand the emphasis on taxation raises two problems.
First, an indirect tax T;1ill in gen.eral be borne only partially by the

consumers in the form of higher prices.

The supply curve of labor (as a

function of nominal wages) shifts to the left, but equilibrium wages
will rise less than proportionally

to the rise in prices.

In additic•,

the employers, facing higher costs, may be able to raise output prices
unless foreign demand is perfectly elastic.

In short, the actual importance

of indirect taxes on the wage level and on profits depends on the elasticities
of supply and demand of consumption goods, of labor and of the final product.

-22A second problem arises from the Dutch national debt being
largely domestically held.

It is necessary to assume that the

rentiers who owned the debt were a different subset of the population
than the industrialists whose profits are curbed by the high wages,
and that they had no interest in investing in industry.

Otherwise,

the high-wage-low-profit result of the Wilson-effect will be insignificant,
since industrialists are assumed to reinvest a part of their profit.
Finally, one could return to the entrepreneurship argument pro
pounded above,

Hicr.ceconomic theory postulates wages to be equal to

the marginal product of labor if ::1nd only if the firm maximizes profits.
But the essence of the er...trepr"me~1rship ar 0 u;:,ent seems to be that these
"bad" entrepreneurs 'W:e·.:-e in fact not nw~dmizing profits.

It does not

matter whc~ther tl1ey were mmci.miz:.:1.z sane U''.:ility function (in which
profits appear as cne a.q:;u:11clt': among many) or ,;,;;1ether they were not
maximizing anyth::.ng at 1:,:1; in either case Hages will be some.where be tween average anq::margin2.l. p.Loduct, and thus higher than in a country in

which entrepreneurs are more aggressive.
V

To summarize the foregoing, there is reason to believe that lower
wages may have been important in determining rapid industrialization in
Belgium and high wages in determining Dutch stagnation.

It was demonstrat

ed that there were structural differences between the two countries that
could enhance such a gap.

It is necessary to show, however, that wages

were in fact significantly lower in Belgium.

To look at nominal wages

would be sufficient in this case s:Lnce for our purpose the interesting
problem is not the standard of livinz of the workers, but rather the slice

-23that is left over of the revenue pie for the producer after wages have
been paid.
Aggregate income distribution date, for this period are, however,
virtually unavailable.

For England, for example, the data before 1880 are

6
-F •
1 2.ggreeate .~igures
· ma-:e
1 e t e co
.
poss1"b1_e. ~
t oo seattere d ana' incomp

As to

the iow Countries, for ,·::ost of the first half of the 19th century the data
are of such nature as to cast heavy doubt on the validity of any inter
spatial comparison.

It is thus fortunate that there is one source that

allows us to perforH the comparison without the usual caveats pertaining
to the comparison of data assembled by different statistical services.
This is the Dutch industrial aurvey of 1819.

64

This survey, actually

undertaken in.~1820, contains valuable information about the number of
industrial firms~ the number of adults and children employed and the
daily wages earned.

In addition some qualitative information as to the

"state of business 11 as compared with previous periods is supplied, some
general remarks added.

Since the t:eturns are;.-organized by province, it

was possible to calculate aggregates which could be used for North vs.
South comparisons.
Some of the main defects of this survey should be mentioned, in
order to underline the fact that these data are crude approximations
and unsuitable for more powerful and refined econometric tests.

For

one tl!i:tng, the data shown in table (1) are ?rovincial averages, weighted
by the number of ~JOrkers in each industry in that province.

However,

the original wage entries for each industry in each province as they
appear in the returns, are already averages over all firms in that

-24industry.

There is strong reason to believe that unweighted averages

were employed by the officials in charge of aggregating the original
returns.

This procedure tends to bias the figures downwards since it

seems that wages were positively correlated with the size of firms
(though the correlation is weak).

Other sources of possible bias and

inaccuracy are payment of wages in kind, the seasonal nature of some
forms of employment, the fact that many wages were piece..·-rather than
daily wages and the particular timing of the survey (at the end of a
prolonged depression).

Some other shortcomings of the data, stemming

from clerical or administrative error, have been corrected as far as
possible.

65

Nonetheless, the 1819 survey constitutes a unique source of

information for this pet:tocl.

Tt sho111 n he mP.nticmed thl'lt by checkine

provincial returns (as far as they were a\•ailable) against aggregate

returns, it could be verified that most municipalities (uhich were in
charge of the actual collecting of the data) conducted the survey in
a responsible and efficient ,1ay, and the compilation and editing were
carriedoout with scrutiny.

In spite of its weaknesses, the 1819 survey

thus:provides a unique opportunity to test the hypotheses advanced in
this paper.

The main aggregates, computed from the returns, are pre

sented in Table I.
It can readily be seen that adults' wages, taken as whole, are
almost 60% higher in the Northern provinces.

lloreover, the two Northern

provinces in which wages are relatively low, Overijssel and N. Brabant,
are the same provinces in which proto-industry existed and where the
nuclei of modern industry started in the --t830's.

In the Belgian pro-
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vinces wages are exceptionally low in Flanders and Antwerpen, somewhat higher (but still considerably below the Horthern average) in LiE!ge.

The only exceptions are Hainault and Namur, partially explained by the
importance of coal mines in these two provinces, which traditionally
paid higher wages.

----26Table I:

Total Number of Firms~ Adults and Children Employed and
Daily Wages in Cents

(1)

(2)

Firms

Province

(3)
Adults

(4)

Adults' Wages

55.2
62.7
86.0
94.2
82.5
82.0
76.5
58.2
76.0
73.4

N. Brabant

8,659

12,716

2,400

Geldtlrland
s. Holland
N. Holland

5,130
6,764
8,493

6,692
20~446
25,674

1,267
1,739
2,184

Zeeland
Utrecht

3,094
3,126

3,653
8,169

621
2,438

Friesland
Overijssel

4.991
4,636
4,606

8,785
12,209

1,384
3,261
852

Groningen
Drenthe
Total North
s. Brabant
Limburg
Liage
E. Flanders
W. Flanders

(5)

Children

1,234

6,606
1,967

50,733

106,917

16.146

·6, 732

.-538

6,770

13,608
6,371

5,482

27,911

37,2.88
59,336
8,415
2,712

101,601
74,675

7,192

n.d.

54.S

24.1
23.6

23,796

47.8

19.5

39,942

54.1

20.6

142,184

299,436

"1-1.'t}"tal

193,055

406,353

See footnote.64.

22.. 3
n.d.

48.6

Total Soutj-

Source:

13.S
32.6

30.6

8,395

.i

19.0
21.2

70.6.

23,167
12,295

Luxembourg

18.2
25.8
20.2

77.1

52.4
65,6
40~J,.

32,893
6.915

16.5

22.4
9.5
19.6
i3.9
17.5
12.8
29.0

74.8
59,8

2.36
4,018
10,780
3,806
2,591
163
1,391
273

Hainault
Namur
Antwerpen

(6)

Children I s

32.3

J'19.lf::S

-27-

0t~er hypotheses, testable in principle, can be derived from
the simple model presented in section III.

For example, one could

test the hypothesis that as long as the proto-industry exists, wages
in the modern sector do not rise significantly.

In the Hetherlands

we should see a stable or declining wage so long as population growth
is unaccompanied by industrialization.

Another test could focus on

the relative importance of the wage differential by estimating proxies
to the ploughing-back and technological parameters of eq. (12).

It

should also be possible to correlate the relative importance of the
proto-industry with the wage level, but the availability of data is
a major obstacle here, compounding difficulties in defining the
relevant variables.
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